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Abstract
Named Data Networking (NDN) is a promising network architecture being considered as a possible replacement for
the current IP-based (host-centric) Internet infrastructure. NDN can overcome the fundamental limitations of the cur-
rent Internet, in particular, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. However, NDN can be subject to new type of DoS attacks
namely Interest flooding attacks and content poisoning. These types of attacks exploit key architectural features of
NDN. This paper presents a new intelligent hybrid algorithm for proactive detection of DoS attacks and adaptive mit-
igation reaction in NDN. In the detection phase, a combination of multiobjective evolutionary optimization algorithm
with PSO in the context of the RBF neural network has been applied in order to improve the accuracy of DoS attack
prediction. Performance of the proposed hybrid approach is also evaluated successfully by some benchmark problems.
In the adaptive reaction phase, we introduced a framework for mitigating DoS attacks based on the misbehaving type
of network nodes. The evaluation through simulations shows that the proposed intelligent hybrid algorithm (proactive
detection and adaptive reaction) can quickly and effectively respond and mitigate DoS attacks in adverse conditions
in terms of the applied performance criteria.
Keywords: Named Data Networking, DoS attacks, Intelligent Hybrid Algorithm, RBF neural networks, Particle
Swarm Optimization, NSGA II
1. Introduction
In recent years there have been several efforts to de-
sign new network architectures for a viable and vital
replacement for the current IP-based Internet [1, 2, 3].
These new architectures are designed to better cope with
the fundamental limitations of the Internet in supporting
today’s content-oriented services [4, 5]. In particular,
there have been significant efforts regarding security,
privacy, better mobility, scalability and efficient content
distribution [6, 7]. Strong security has been one of the
main design requirements for these architectures [8, 9].
Named Data Networking (NDN) [10] is one of these
architectures as an ongoing research effort that aims
to move the Internet into the future with a content-
centric approach. NDN is a prominent example of
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Content-Centric Networking (CCN, also referred to as
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) or Data-Centric
Networking (DCN)) design. In CCN, content -rather
than hosts, like in IP-based design- plays the central role
in the communications [11, 12].
In contrast to today’s Internet, a key goal of the NDN
project is ”security by design” [13, 14, 15]. Unlike the
current Internet (host-based) approach in which secu-
rity, integrity and trust should be provided in the com-
munication channel, CCN secures content (information)
itself and puts integrity and trust as the content proper-
ties [16, 17]. However, with this new paradigm, new
kinds of attacks and anomalies -from Denial of Service
(DoS) to privacy attacks- will arise [18, 19]. The big
question is how resilient will this new NDN architec-
ture be against DoS/DDoS attacks [15, 20]. An adver-
sary can take advantage of two features unique to NDN
namely Content Store (CS) and Pending Interest Ta-
ble (PIT) to mount DoS/DDoS attacks specific to NDN
such as Interest flooding attacks and content poisoning
[20, 21].
Preprint submitted to Journal of Neurocomputing October 27, 2014
The first goal of any protection scheme against DoS at-
tack is the early detection (ideally long before the de-
structive traffic build-up) of its existence [22, 21]. In or-
der to disarm DoS/DDoS attacks and any deviation, not
only the detection of the malevolent behavior must be
achieved, but the network traffic belonging to the attack-
ers should be also blocked [23, 24, 25]. Thus, a predic-
tor (detector) should take an appropriate action to thwart
the attacks and should be able to adjust itself to the
changing dynamics of the anomalies/attacks [20, 26]. In
an attempt to tackle with the new kinds of DoS attacks
and the threat of future unknown attacks and anoma-
lies, many researchers have been developing intelligent
learning techniques as a significant part of the current
research on DoS attacks detection [16, 27]. The most
popular approach for DOS/DDoS attacks prediction is
using Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) classification
[28, 29, 30]. ANNs have become one of the most vi-
tal and valuable tools in solving many complex prac-
tical problems [31, 32], among which the Radial basis
function (RBF) neural networks have been successfully
applied for solving dynamic system problems, because
they can predict the behavior directly from input/output
data [33, 34, 35]. RBF networks have many remarkable
characteristics, such as simple network structure, strong
learning capacity, better approximation capacities and
fast learning speed. The difficulty of applying the RBF
networks is in network training which should select and
estimate properly the input parameters including cen-
ters and widths of the basis functions and the neuron
connection weights [32, 36, 37]. In order to find the
most appropriate parameters, an optimization algorithm
can be used [38, 39]. An optimization algorithm will
attempt to find an optimal choice that satisfies defined
constraints and make an optimization criterion (perfor-
mance or cost index) maximize or minimize [38, 40].
Hence, to improve the prediction accuracy and robust-
ness of the RBF network, network parameters (centers,
widths and weights) should be simultaneously tuned
[32]. Some of the existing algorithms to achieve that are
given in [32, 36, 41, 42, 43]. Almost all algorithms com-
pute the optimal estimation of the basis function centers
by mean of error minimization, i.e., accuracy based on
Mean-Square Error (MSE) [36, 43, 44, 45]. However,
MSE is not suitable for determining the optimal position
of basis function centers. Since the MSE decreases, the
number of centers increases [46]. To accomplish this
task, we develop our proactive detection algorithm for
globally well-separating units’ centers and their local
optimization by MSE (decreasing the error caused by
corresponding data points and their centers, separately).
But the optimal placement and well-separated centers
can increase MSE [47]. It is generally accepted that
well-separated (external separation of) centers and their
local optimization (internal homogeneity) are conflict-
ing objectives [46, 48]. This trade-off is a well-known
problem as the Multiobjective Optimization Problem
(MOP) [49, 50, 51, 52]. This paper applies NSGA II
(Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm) proposed
by Deb et al. (2002) to solve this problem, as it has
recently been frequently applied to various scenarios
[53, 54, 55, 56]. On the other hand, for (near) optimal
estimation and adjustment of two others RBF parame-
ters (units’ widths and output weights), we implement
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) that favors global
and local search of its interacting particles which has
proved to be effective in finding the optimum in a search
space [57, 58, 59].
When the DoS attacks by the proposed intelligent pre-
dictor are identified, the second phase (i.e., adaptive
mitigation reaction) is triggered by enforcing explicit
limitations against adversaries. The contribution of this
paper is summarized in three objectives. The first ob-
jective of this paper is to develop an algorithm to re-
solve the hybrid learning problem of a RBF network us-
ing multiobjective optimization and particle swarm op-
timization to obtain a simple and more accurate RBF
network-based classifier (predictor). The second objec-
tive is utilization of this optimized RBF network-based
predictor in proactive detection of the DoS/DDoS at-
tacks in NDN. The third objective is introducing a new
algorithm to enable NDN routers to perform quickly
and effectively adaptive reaction (recovery) from net-
work problems, in order to keep track of legitimate data
delivery performance and effectively shutting down ma-
licious users’ traffic.
There are three main advantages of the proposed predic-
tion (classification) method; first, the proposed method
can be applied to classification of any real-world prob-
lem; second, it gives better results in terms of the
low misclassification, accuracy and robustness for some
benchmark problems. And third, it provides a promis-
ing performance in prediction of DoS attacks in NDN.
Moreover, the evaluation through simulations shows
that the proposed intelligent hybrid algorithm (proactive
detection and adaptive reaction) can quickly and effec-
tively respond and mitigate DoS attacks in adverse con-
ditions in terms of the applied performance criteria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the background materials of the NDN, and
follows by the explanation of the related DoS attacks in
Section 3. Section 4 provides the related work. Section
5 presents RBF neural networks. Section 6 describes
the PSO algorithm. In Section 7, NSGA II is presented
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in detail. Section 8 describes the proposed hybrid intel-
ligent method. Section 9 examines the detection (clas-
sification) phase of the proposed hybrid algorithm on
several benchmark problems. Evaluation environment
is described in Section 10 in detail. Section 11 pro-
poses our countermeasure including proactive detection
and adaptive reaction mechanism against DoS attacks in
NDN. Detailed analysis and discussions are explained
in Section 12. Finally, Section 13 draws conclusions.
2. NDN overview
NDN is a novel next-generation Internet archi-
tecture based on the principle of CCN (Content-
Centric Networking) paradigm, where contents are re-
trieved by their names instead of by the network ad-
dresses where they are hosted [60]. Data names
in NDN are hierarchically structured, e.g., eighth
fragment of a youtube video (file) would be named
/youtube/videos/A7m5I6n8kVUw/8. NDN is one
of the five NSF-sponsored Future Internet Architecture
(FIA) [21]. It supports two types of messages: Interest
and content (Fig. 1). A consumer asks for a content
Figure 1: CCN packet types [12]
by routing an Interest request using name prefixes in-
stead of today’s IP prefixes. Interest packet is routed
towards the location of the origin content where it has
been published. Any router and middle node on the way
checks its cache for matching copies of the requested
content. If a cached copy of any piece of Interest request
is found, it is returned to the requester along the path
the request came from. On the way back, all the middle
nodes store a copy of content in their caches to answer
to probable same Interest requests from subsequent re-
quests [16]. Each NDN router maintains three major
data structures including Forwarding Information Base
(FIB), Pending Interest Table (PIT) and Content Store
(CS) or buffer memory. FIB is a lookup table used to
determine interfaces for forwarding incoming Interests
packets which contains [name prefix , interface num-
ber] entries. Another lookup table is PIT which con-
tains outstanding entries [Interest prefix , arrival inter-
face]. When a NDN router receives an Interest packet,
it first checks its CS (cache). If there is no copy of the
requested content, it looks up its PIT table. If the same
name is already in the PIT and the arrival interface of the
present Interest is already in the set of arrival interface
of the corresponding PIT entry, the Interest is discarded.
If a PIT entry for the same name exists, the router up-
dates the PIT entry by adding a new arrival interface to
the set. The Interest is not forwarded further. Other-
wise, the router creates a new PIT entry and forwards
the present Interest using its FIB [12, 61].
3. DoS attacks in NDN
The new variations of DoS attacks might be quite ef-
fective against NDN. An adversary can take advantage
of two features unique in NDN routers as CS and PIT
to mount DoS/DDoS attacks into NDN. There are two
major categories of DoS attacks in NDN infrastructure
[20, 62]:
1. Interest Flooding Attack (IFA): It is partly due
to the lack of authentication of Interest packets
(source). Anyone can generate Interests packets
and any middle router (node) only knows that a
particular Interest packet entered on a specific in-
terface.
2. Content/Cache Poisoning: The adversary tries to
make routers forward and cache corrupted or fake
data packets in order to prevent consumers from
retrieving the original (legitimate) content.
3.1. Interest Flooding Attack
In this type of attack, the adversary (controlling a set
of possibly geographically distributed zombies) gener-
ates a large number of Interest packets aiming to (1)
overwhelm PIT table in routers in order to prevent le-
gitimate users to satisfied their Interest packets and (2)
swamp the target content producers [20]. There are
three types of Interest flooding attacks, based on the
type of content requested [20]:
1. existing or static: it is quiet limited since in-
network content caching provides a built-in coun-
termeasure. If several zombies from different paths
generate large number of Interest packets for an
existing content which settles in all intervening
routes’ caches, these Interest packets for the same
content can not propagate to the producer(s) since
they are satisfied by cached copies.
2. dynamically-generated: There is no benefits via
caching copies. Since requested content is dy-
namic, all Interest packets are routed to content
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producer(s), thus consuming bandwidth and router
PIT table. Also, content producer might waste con-
siderable computational resources due to the sign-
ing the content (per-packet operation) which is it-
self expensive.
3. non-existent (unsatisfied Interests): Such Interest
packets cannot be collapsed by routers, and are
routed toward the content producer(s). This type
of Interest packets take up space in router PIT table
until they expire. A large number of non-existent
Interest packets in PIT table lead to legitimate In-
terest packets being dropped in the network.
4. Related work
As a new Internet architecture proposal, there is
very limited work recently regarding to mitigation of
DoS/DDoS attacks in Named Data Networking. Gasti et
al. [20] performed initial analysis of NDN’s resilience
to DoS attacks. This work identifies two new types
of attacks specific to NDN (Interest flooding and con-
tent/cache poisoning) and discusses effects and poten-
tial countermeasures. However, the paper does not ana-
lyze DoS attacks and their countermeasures. Afanasyev
et al. [15] presented three mitigation algorithms (token
bucket with per interface fairness, satisfaction-based In-
terest acceptance and satisfaction-based pushback) that
allow routers to exploit their state information to thwart
Interest flooding attacks. Among these three miti-
gation algorithms, satisfaction-based pushback mecha-
nism could effectively shut down malicious users while
preventing legitimate users from service degradation.
This work uses a simple and static attackers model
(sending junk Interests as fast as possible), and it does
not consider intermediate router’s cache and always for-
wards all the way to the producer. Compagno et al. [21]
introduced a framework for local and distributed Inter-
est flooding attack mitigation, in particular, rapid gener-
ation of large numbers of Interest for non-existent con-
tents that saturate the victim router’s PIT. Authors sim-
ulated a simple attackers model, and their countermea-
sure has been able to use around 80-90% of the available
bandwidth in the most cases during the attacks. Dai et
al. [63] proposed Interest traceback as a counter mea-
sure against NDN DDoS attacks, which traces back to
the originator of the attacking Interest packets. In this
paper, when PIT exceeds its threshold, Interest trace-
back is triggered. This method responds to the attack
by generating spoofed Data packets to satisfy the long-
unsatisfied Interest packets in the PIT by tracing back
to the Interest originators. This method is not proac-
tive, makes overhead in the network by increasing of
made spoofed contents. It leads to middle routers cache
bogus contents. This paper also assumes that the long-
unsatisfied Interests in the PIT is adversary and others
unsatisfied Interest are normal usages. Another short-
coming of this method is that the router drops the in-
coming packet rate of the interface which has too many
long-unsatisfied Interest packets. As a result of this in-
dependent decision, the probability of legitimate Inter-
ests being forwarded decreases rapidly as the number of
hops between the content requester and producer. Choi
et al. [18] provided an overview of threats of Inter-
est flooding attacks for non-existent contents on NDN.
Authors simulated and explained the effect of Interest
flooding DoS attacks by a simple scenario over the qual-
ity of services for legitimate Interest packets from nor-
mal users due to PIT full. However, they do not analyze
DoS attacks and their countermeasures.
5. RBF neural networks
Radial Basis Function (RBF) is a kind of feed-
forward neural networks, which were developed by
Broomhead and Lowe in 1998 [64]. This type of neu-
ral networks use a supervised algorithm and have been
broadly employed for classification and interpolation re-
gression [65]. As compared to other neural networks,
RBF neural networks have better approximation charac-
teristics, faster training procedures and simple network
architecture. For these reasons, researchers have con-
tinued working on improving the performance of RBF
learning algorithms [66, 67]. The RBF neural networks
have three layers architecture including a single hidden
layer of units. The first layer has n input units which
connects the input space to the hidden layer. The hid-
den layer has m RBF units, which transforms the input
units to the output layer. The output layer, consisting of
l linear units. The output layer implements a weighted
sum of hidden unit outputs. The input layer is non-linear
while the output is linear. Due to non-linear approxima-
tion properties in RBF, this type of networks are able to
model the complex mappings [34, 37]. The real output
in output layer is given by:
ys(X) =
k∑
j=1
w jsφ(
∥∥∥P −C j∥∥∥
σ j
) f or 1 ≤ s ≤ l (1)
Where ys is s-th network output, P is an input pattern,
w js is the weight of the link between j-th hidden neuron
and s-th output neuron, C j is the center of the j-th RBF
unit in the hidden layer, and σ j is the width of the j-
th unit in the hidden layer. The φ denotes to an basis
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(activation) function. The Gaussian activation function
is used in this paper, which is given by [68]:
φ j(r) = exp(−
∥∥∥P −C j∥∥∥2
2σ2j
) j = 1, 2, 3, ..., p (2)
Where r is the variable of radial basis function (φ).
Figure 2: Schematic of the NSGA II procedure
6. Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
PSO was initially introduced in 1995 by James
Kennedy and Russell Eberhart as a global optimization
technique [69]. It was inspired by the social behavior
of a bird flock or fish school. It is a population based
meta-heuristic method that optimizes a problem by ini-
tializing a flock of birds randomly over the search space
where each bird is referred as a particle and the popu-
lation of particles is called swarm [70]. Each particle
is a candidate solution to the problem which is assigned
a velocity vector and has a memory which helps it in
remembering its previous best position (known as lo-
cal best, lbest). The particles move iteratively around
in the search space according to a simple mathemati-
cal formula over the particle’s position and velocity to
find the global best position (known as Gbest). In the
n-dimensional search space, the position and the veloc-
ity of i-th particle at t-th iteration of algorithm is de-
noted by vector Xi(t) = (xi1(t), xi2(t), ..., xin(t)) and vec-
tor Vi(t) = (vi1(t), vi2(t), ..., vin(t)), respectively. Usually
a fitness function is the objective function to be min-
imized or maximized. Hereafter, a record of the best
position of particle based on the fitness function value
is kept in process. The best previously visited position
of the particle i at current stage is denoted by vector
lbesti = (lbesti1, lbesti2, ..., lbestin) as the personal best.
The position of the best objective function value until
the current stage is also recorded as the global best po-
sition denoted by Gbest = (gbest1, gbest2, ..., gbestn).
The velocity and position of particle i at iteration k+1
can be calculated according the following equations:
Vi(k + 1) = ωVi(k) + c1r1(lbesti(k) − Xi(k))
+c2r2(gbest(k) − Xi(k)) (3)
Xi(k + 1) = Xi(k) + Vi(k + 1) (4)
Where ω is the inertia weight, c1 (cognitive parameter)
and c2 (social parameter) are constants which control
the search space between the local best position and the
global best position (generally c1 = c2 = 2 [48]). Pa-
rameters r1 and r2 are random numbers uniformly dis-
tributed within [0 1]. Since larger ω performs more
efficient global search and smaller one performs more
effective local search, Eberhart and Shi [71] used Eq.
(5) that properly balances between exploration (global
search) and exploitation (local search) to avoid prema-
ture convergence to a local optimum.
ω = ωmax − t · (ωmax − ωmin)T (5)
Where ωmax, ωmin,T and t denote the maximum inertia
weight, the minimum inertia weight, the total and the
current number of iterations, respectively.
7. Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm
(NSGA) II
NSGA II is one of the most widely and popular multi-
objective optimization algorithms with three consider-
able properties including fast non-dominated sorting ap-
proach, fast crowded distance estimation procedure and
simple crowded comparison operator [72]. Fig. 2 shows
the NSGA II procedure. Generally, NSGA II can be
roughly detailed as following steps [72, 73, 74]:
Step 1: Population initialization
A set of random solutions (chromosomes) with a uni-
form distribution based on the problem range and con-
straint are generated. The first generation is a N × D
matrix. N and D are identified as the number of chro-
mosomes and decision variables (genes), respectively.
Step 2: Non-dominated sort
Sorting process based on non domination criteria of the
initialized population.
Step 3: Crowding distance
Chromosomes are classified to the Pareto fronts using:
dI j =
M∑
m=1
f
Imj+1
m − f I
m
j−1
m
f Maxm − f Minm
(6)
Where, dI j is crowded distance of jth solution, M is
number of objectives, f
Imj+1
m and f
Imj−1
m are values of mth
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Figure 3: The overview of the proposed DoS mitigation method in NDN
objective for ( j − 1)th and ( j + 1)th solution, f Maxm is
maximum value of mth objective function among solu-
tions of the current population, f Minm is minimum value
of mth objective function among solutions of the cur-
rent population, I j is the jth solution in the sorted list
and ( j − 1) and ( j + 1) are two nearest neighboring so-
lutions on both sides of I j. Afterwards, the algorithm
searches the nearest points (solutions) with more value
of dI j . Solutions in the best-known Pareto set should
be uniformly distributed and diverse over of the Pareto
front in order to provide the decision maker a true pic-
ture of trade-offs. Then, Pareto fronts are ranked from
the best to the worst.
Step 4: Selection
The selection of chromosomes is carried out to select
appropriate chromosomes (parents) using the crowded
tournament operator. The crowded tournament opera-
tor compares different solutions with two criteria, (1)
a non-dominated rank and (2) a crowding distance in
the population. In this process, if a solution dominates
the others, it will be selected as the parent. Otherwise,
the solution with the higher value of crowding distance
(highest diversity) will be selected.
Step 5: Genetic algorithm operators
There are a variety of recombination (crossover) and
mutation operators.
Step 6: Recombination and selection
The offspring population is combined with the current
generation population and the total population is sorted
based on non-domination. The new generation is filled
by chromosomes from each front subsequently until the
population size exceeds the current population size N.
8. The proposed hybrid intelligent method for DoS
mitigation in NDN
In this section, we introduce our method, a two-phase
framework for mitigating DoS attacks in NDN. The first
phase being proactive detection (see section 8.1) and the
second one adaptive reaction (see section 11.2). The
proposed predictor in the first phase is a global frame-
work so that we can use the predictor in other networks.
In this paper, we apply the proposed predictor success-
fully on some benchmark problems and NDN and leave
further investigations in other networks to future work.
A diagram of the two phases of the proposed method is
shown in Fig. 3.
8.1. The proposed intelligent classifier (predictor)
This section presents the details of proposed intel-
ligent algorithm for classification problems. Our ap-
proach composes of two main phases. It is depicted in
Fig. 4. Each phase is given in the next subsections.
8.1.1. Phase 1: Improvement of RBF parameters
In the first phase -training (optimization)- we intro-
duce a new hybrid optimization approach for designing
RBF neural networks which can be implemented for
real-world problems. Firstly, a new multiobjective
optimization algorithm as NSGA II for adjusting
centers of the RBF units is introduced. This algorithm
obtains various non-dominated sets that provide an
appropriate balance between two conflicting objectives:
well-separated and local optimization of RBF centers.
Secondly, PSO algorithm has been applied to simul-
taneously tune widths of the RBF units and output
weights through well-placed centers. The algorithm is
presented below:
A. First part (adjusting RBF units’ centers based on
NSGA II):
1. Problem definition:
1-1- population size (N), maximum iteration
(IterMax), crossover percentage (pCrossover),
number of parents (offspring) after crossover op-
erator (nCrossover = 2 × round(pCrossover ×
N
2 )), mutation percentage (pMutation), num-
ber of mutants after mutation (nMutation =
6
Figure 4: Proposed intelligent algorithm for more accurate classification
round(pMutation × N)), mutation rate (mu), mu-
tation step size (sigma = 0.1).
2. Initialize population:
2-1- Generate the initial populations (individuals)
P, including P1, P2, ..., PN .
2-2- Calculate the two conflicting cost functions as
DBI and MSE (presented in section 8.1.3) for each
population.
2-3- Rank all populations according to their non-
dominance.
2-4- Calculate the crowding distances for all popu-
lations to keep the population diversity (Eq. 6).
2-5- Sort the non-dominated solutions in descend-
ing crowding distance and rank values.
3. NSGA II main loop:
3-1- Execute the evolution process including
crossover and mutation operators:
a. Execute crossover operator, PopCrossover
(this paper adopts the two-point crossover).
b. Execute mutation operator, PopMutation (A
Gaussian distributed random number with mean
zero and variance 1 is used [75, 76]).
c. Merge populations:
P = [P PopCrossover PopMutation].
3-2- Run steps 2-3 (rank), 2-4 (crowding distance)
and 2-5 (sort) over the merged P.
3-3- Truncate/Select the generated population P to
the range of population size: P = P(1 : N).
3-4- Run steps 2-3 (rank), 2-4 (crowding distance)
and 2-5 (sort) over the truncated P.
3-5- Store Pareto-optimal front (non-dominated
set) in the archive as PF1.
3-6- Repeat Step 3 until termination condition
(IterMax) is reached.
3-7- Keep the final PF1 including the (near) opti-
mal placement of RBF units’ centers.
B. Second part (calculating widths of the RBF units
and output weights based on PSO algorithm):
1. Problem definition:
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1-1- population size (N), maximum iteration
(IterMax) and number of RBF Kernel obtained
from PF1 in phase A (nKernel).
1-2- Upper and lower bound of width (σ) and
weight (w) variables.
1-3- Adjust the PSO parameters: inertia weight
(ω) which is linearly decrease by Eq. 5, acceler-
ation coefficients (c1 = c2 = 2), and two random
numbers (r1 and r2) which distributed uniformly
in [0 1].
2. Initialize population for each particle:
2-1- Generate the initial popula-
tions (particle positions) including
Particle(1), Particle(2), ..., Particle(N):
Particle(i).Position.σ and Particle(i).Position.w.
i = 1, 2, ...,N.
particle(i).Position.σ = Continuous uniform
random numbers between σ.Lower and σ.U pper
in size of nKernel.
particle(i).Position.w = Continuous uniform
random numbers between w.Lower and w.U pper
in size of nKernel.
2-2- Initialize velocity vectors in a feasible space
for each particle:
particle(i).Velocity.σ = a nKernal size zero
matrix.
particle(i).Velocity.w = a nKernal size zero
matrix.
2-3- Evaluate each particle by Gaussian basis
function in each RBF units (Eq. 1). Calculate
Gaussian basis function with two tuned parameters
(σ -centers’ widths- and w -output weights- from
PSO) and optimal placement of RBF units’ centers
from archive PF1.
2-4- Initially, personal best (lbest) is the current
calculated cost.
3. Set the global best (gbest) to a particle with the
lowest cost.
4. PSO main loop:
4-1- Update velocity for each particle by Eq. 3.
4-2- Control the lower (Vmin) and upper (Vmax)
bounds of velocity:
Vmin ≤ Vit ≤ Vmax. Where, i (particle id)=1, 2,
..., N and t (iteration number)=1, 2, ..., IterMax.
4-3- Update position by Eq. 4.
4-4- If the current velocity and position are out-
side of the boundaries, they take the upper bound
or lower bound. They are multiplied by -1 so that
they search in the opposite direction (mirroring to
feasible search space).
4-5- Update personal best (lbest): if the current
particle cost is better than the previous (recorded
in lbest) particle cost, then set the current particle
cost as the personal best.
4-6- Update global best (gbest): if the current per-
sonal best is better than the global best, then set
the current personal best as the global best in the
swarm.
5. Repeat Step 4 until termination condition (MaxIter)
is reached. Otherwise, gbest is the optimized RBF
units’ widths and output weights.
8.1.2. Phase 2: classification of new input patterns
In the second phase -prediction (classification)- we
classify (predict) the class type of new input patterns,
which we do not know about their target classes in prior.
The classification is calculated by defining bins. Data
samples should be normalized into [0 1], when deal-
ing with parameters of different units and scales [77].
Since data set is normalized in range of [0 1], bin val-
ues should be defined in this range. The number of bin
ranges are equal to the number of target classes in train-
ing phase. Then, we can determine which data object
falls into a specified bin range. For instance, if the num-
ber of target class in a particular data set is five classes,
then the range of bin values can be organized in the
range of [0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1]. Hereafter, constructed
RBF neural network from first phase is executed over
the input patterns. The RBF output is always a decimal
number between [0 1]. This output assigns to the clos-
est and most ideal index of specified bin range, e.g., if
output=0.65, then the input pattern falls into fourth bin.
It means that the predicted class is four. The pseudo-
code of classification computation is given below:
1- Define some input parameters:
LowEdge = lower bound of target class.
UpEdge = upper bound of target class.
NumBins= number of target classes in training data set.
BinEdges= Generate linearly spaced vectors between
LowEdge and U pEdge in the size of NumBins, where
the bin range is equal to the number of target class.
2- Assign input patterns into the closest index of spec-
ified bin range. The index of bin range is the predicted
classes of input patterns.
Table 1: The four applied benchmark data sets
Data set No. of features No. of classes No. of patterns
Wine 13 3 178
Iris 4 3 150
Ionosphere 34 2 351
Zoo 17 7 101
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8.1.3. Objective functions in NSGA II
Two objective functions are used to evaluate the RBF
network units’ centers performance. The two objective
functions for minimization problems are:
1. Local optimization based on Mean Square Error
(MSE):
Given the set of centers (c), the set of corresponding
data objects (x), cx denotes the center corresponding to
the x, and N is the number of data points, MSE can be
calculated as:
MS E =
1
N
N∑
i=1
d(xi, cx)2 (7)
2. Well-separated (well-placed) RBF units’ centers
based on Davies-Boulding Index (DBI).
Based on our experiments [46], we have found it quite
reliable. DBI [78] takes into account both compactness
and separation criteria that makes similar data points
within the same centers and places other data points in
distinct centers. The compactness of a group of data ob-
jects with corresponding center is calculated based on
the MSE. The separation is measured by the distance
between centers ci and c j. In general, the DBI is given
by:
1
NC
∑
i
max j, j,i
[ 1ni
∑
xCi d(x, ci) +
1
n j
∑
xC j d(x, c j)]
d(ci, c j)
(8)
Where, NC is the number of centers, x is the corre-
sponding data objects, ni is the number of data objects
belonging to the center ci.
Table 2: adjusting RBF units’ centers in Wine
n Pop. Iter. MSE Std. SEM CI (95%)
PSO:
20 20 1500 0.19224 0.1235 0.0101 [0.182 0.671]
40 30 2000 0.16474 0.1207 0.0104 [0.176 0.649]
70 35 2500 0.14989 0.1013 0.0088 [0.165 0.572]
GA:
20 20 1500 0.19423 0.1242 0.0104 [0.188 0.68]
40 30 2000 0.16532 0.1222 0.0105 [0.196 0.671]
70 35 2500 0.3729 0.1072 0.0093 [0.171 0.583]
ICA:
20 20 1500 0.41448 0.1421 0.0123 [0.349 0.907]
40 30 2000 0.3396 0.1235 0.0107 [0.327 0.812]
70 35 2500 0.30012 0.124 0.0107 [0.291 0.777]
DE:
20 20 1500 0.38732 0.1484 0.0128 [0.314 0.895]
40 30 2000 0.41173 0.1555 0.0134 [0.318 0.928]
70 35 2500 0.41586 0.1442 0.0125 [0.346 0.911]
9. Benchmarking the proposed intelligent classifier
(predictor)
For assurance of robustness and accuracy of our pro-
posed intelligent hybrid classifier (predictor), we ap-
Table 3: adjusting RBF units’ centers in Iris
n Pop. Iter. MSE Std. SEM CI (95%)
PSO:
25 35 2000 0.00957 0.0309 0.0036 [0.009 0.169]
35 50 2500 0.00661 0.0346 0.0033 [0.006 0.142]
40 70 3000 0.00541 0.0362 0.0032 [0.007 0.135]
GA:
25 35 2000 0.01078 0.0394 0.0037 [0.019 0.173]
35 50 2500 0.00975 0.0439 0.0041 [0.0072 0.175]
40 70 3000 0.00598 0.0365 0.0033 [-0.001 0.138]
ICA:
25 35 2000 0.02359 0.0666 0.0063 [0.011 0.269]
35 50 2500 0.01497 0.0438 0.0041 [-0.209 0.239]
40 70 3000 0.01332 0.0368 0.0035 [0.037 0.182]
DE:
25 35 2000 0.02396 0.0595 0.0056 [0.026 0.26]
35 50 2500 0.02376 0.049 0.0046 [0.05 0.242]
40 70 3000 0.02352 0.0584 0.0055 [0.131 0.153]
Table 4: adjusting RBF units’ centers in Ionosphere
n Pop. Iter. MSE Std. SEM CI (95%)
PSO:
40 60 3000 0.90357 0.4709 0.0297 [-0.104 1.763]
50 80 4000 0.81119 0.457 0.0282 [-0.079 1.673]
60 90 4000 0.74164 0.4496 0.0284 [-0.085 1.631]
GA:
40 60 3000 1.043 0.4953 0.0299 [-0.111 1.836]
50 80 4000 0.9489 0.4615 0.0285 [-0.086 1.763]
60 90 4000 0.9394 0.4501 0.0278 [-0.093 1.741]
ICA:
40 60 3000 2.113 0.5575 0.0344 [0.25 2.436]
50 80 4000 1.9462 0.4792 0.0295 [0.37 2.25]
60 90 4000 1.8535 0.4743 0.0292 [0.347 2.206]
DE:
40 60 3000 2.6211 0.5671 0.035 [0.405 2.629]
50 80 4000 2.6249 0.5878 0.0362 [0.358 2.663]
60 90 4000 2.5915 0.5493 0.0339 [0.437 2.59]
Table 5: adjusting RBF units’ centers in Zoo
n Pop. Iter. MSE Std. SEM CI (95%)
PSO:
40 50 2000 0.75405 0.23 0.0264 [-0.288 1.289]
50 70 2500 0.67409 0.2622 0.0301 [0.198 1.318]
60 90 3000 0.68884 0.2563 0.0274 [0.249 1.253]
GA:
40 50 2000 0.75469 0.2793 0.032 [0.296 1.371]
50 70 2500 0.68008 0.3057 0.0351 [0.201 1.366]
60 90 3000 0.69329 0.2654 0.0281 [0.315 1.277]
ICA:
40 50 2000 1.1539 0.303 0.0348 [0.315 1.377]
50 70 2500 0.9867 0.3112 0.0357 [0.334 1.554]
60 90 3000 1.0088 0.2826 0.0324 [0.41 1.518]
DE:
40 50 2000 1.96 0.3213 0.0369 [0.733 1.933]
50 70 2500 1.9406 0.2829 0.0325 [0.81 1.919]
60 90 3000 1.8115 0.2736 0.0314 [0.782 1.855]
plied the four classic benchmark problems from the
UCI machine learning repository [79]. Table 1 shows
the main characteristics of these data sets. In the ex-
periments, 70% of data set is used as training data set
and the rest is considered as testing data set in order
to validate the functionality of the proposed method.
We evaluated different performance criteria including
Mean Square Error (MSE), Standard Deviation (Std.),
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Table 6: Classification of Wine data set based on RBF-PSO optimization algorithm
n Pop. Iter. Training data set Test data set
MSE Std. CI (95%) SEM Cls. err. MSE Std. CI (95%) SEM Cls. err.
Units’ centers by PSO:
20 25 2000 0.00838 0.0912 [-0.157 0.158] 0.00692 2 0.01078 0.109 [-0.208 0.2] 0.01567 2
40 30 2500 0.00586 0.08024 [-0.158 0.157] 0.00676 0 0.01389 0.11475 [-0.25 0.199] 0.01814 3
70 40 3000 0.00519 0.07145 [-0.135 0.146] 0.00617 1 0.01316 0.11656 [-0.22 0.237] 0.0174 3
Units’ centers by GA:
20 25 2000 0.0084 0.093 [-0.164 0.166] 0.00725 1 0.01082 0.10907 [-0.216 0.192] 0.01568 3
40 30 2500 0.00598 0.08227 [-0.171 0.173] 0.00624 1 0.01479 0.11874 [-0.265 0.201] 0.0179 4
70 40 3000 0.00525 0.07254 [-0.137 0.148] 0.00626 2 0.01501 0.12183 [-0.261 0.216] 0.01836 3
Units’ centers by ICA:
20 25 2000 0.00917 0.09615 [-0.188 0.189] 0.0083 1 0.01688 0.13139 [-0.262 0.254] 0.0198 4
40 30 2500 0.00716 0.08496 [-0.166 0.167] 0.00734 1 0.01483 0.11884 [-0.234 0.216] 0.01742 3
70 40 3000 0.00677 0.08255 [-0.159 0.165] 0.00713 1 0.01576 0.12683 [-0.038 0.024] 0.01912 3
Units’ centers by DE:
20 25 2000 0.01159 0.10808 [-0.212 0.212] 0.00933 2 0.02135 0.14608 [-0.309 0.264] 0.02202 3
40 30 2500 0.00906 0.09555 [-0.187 0.188] 0.00825 1 0.01401 0.11895 [-0.252 0.211] 0.01778 3
70 40 3000 0.00648 0.08082 [-0.159 0.158] 0.00698 2 0.01327 0.11926 [-0.256 0.211] 0.01787 3
Table 7: Classification of Iris data set based on RBF-PSO optimization algorithm
n Pop. Iter. Training data set Test data set
MSE Std. CI (95%) SEM Cls. err. MSE Std. CI (95%) SEM Cls. err.
Units’ centers by PSO:
25 35 2000 0.007 0.07407 [-0.175 0.125] 0.0079 2 0.01347 0.10954 [0.211 0.219] 0.01844 3
35 50 2500 0.00435 0.06626 [-0.13 0.13] 0.00623 2 0.01419 0.09469 [-0.189 0.182] 0.01692 2
40 70 3000 0.00429 0.07007 [-0.132 0.131] 0.00682 3 0.05785 0.08827 [-0.189 0.157] 0.01551 2
Units’ centers by GA:
25 35 2000 0.00781 0.08877 [-0.174 0.174] 0.00835 2 0.01406 0.11579 [-0.223 0.231] 0.01903 5
35 50 2500 0.00454 0.06768 [-0.132 0.133] 0.00636 1 0.01416 0.10704 [-0.206 0.213] 0.01759 3
40 70 3000 0.00432 0.07391 [-0.145 0.145] 0.00544 2 0.05557 0.0734 [-0.162 0.126] 0.01206 2
Units’ centers by ICA:
25 35 2000 0.0079 0.08717 [-0.153 0.149] 0.00725 2 0.01517 0.12285 [-0.238 0.243] 0.01897 3
35 50 2500 0.00543 0.07405 [-0.146 0.145] 0.00696 3 0.01542 0.12586 [-0.244 0.249] 0.02069 2
40 70 3000 0.00455 0.07008 [-0.137 0.137] 0.00563 2 0.05092 0.10541 [-0.217 0.196] 0.01732 3
Units’ centers by DE:
25 35 2000 0.00782 0.08188 [-0.149 0.149] 0.00721 2 0.01378 0.11638 [-0.15 0.15] 0.01913 3
35 50 2500 0.00493 0.07666 [-0.123 0.124] 0.00592 2 0.01822 0.09973 [-0.202 0.189] 0.01608 2
40 70 3000 0.00625 0.07941 [-0.153 0.158] 0.00747 3 0.05956 0.09912 [-0.192 0.197] 0.01629 3
Table 8: Classification of Ionosphere data set based on RBF-PSO optimization algorithm
n Pop. Iter. Training data set Test data set
MSE Std. CI (95%) SEM Cls. err. MSE Std. CI (95%) SEM Cls. err.
Units’ centers by PSO:
30 60 2000 0.05403 0.22663 [-0.444 0.444] 0.01395 17 0.05838 0.2387 [-0.423 0.513] 0.02544 5
40 80 2500 0.05172 0.22785 [-0.448 0.445] 0.01405 16 0.05553 0.23233 [-0.409 0.502] 0.024767 3
50 90 3000 0.0466 0.20488 [-0.401 0.403] 0.01244 14 0.04855 0.21235 [-0.373 0.459] 0.02289 4
Units’ centers by GA:
30 60 2000 0.05464 0.23407 [-0.451 0.467] 0.01443 19 0.05436 0.22923 [-0.395 0.504] 0.02443 5
40 80 2500 0.06114 0.24773 [-0.485 0.487] 0.01527 20 0.07284 0.27006 [-0.502 0.557] 0.02878 7
50 90 3000 0.05673 0.23859 [-0.473 0.462] 0.01471 17 0.05943 0.24339 [-0.448 0.507] 0.02594 4
Units’ centers by ICA:
30 60 2000 0.07042 0.2658 [-0.528 0.514] 0.01639 19 0.06913 0.26367 [-0.497 0.537] 0.0281 7
40 80 2500 0.06699 0.25932 [-0.508 0.509] 0.01599 20 0.06238 0.24981 [-0.427 0.552] 0.02662 5
50 90 3000 0.06389 0.25318 [-0.491 0.502] 0.01561 21 0.06058 0.24449 [-0.441 0.518] 0.026 5
Units’ centers by DE:
30 60 2000 0.05847 0.24228 [-0.474 0.476] 0.01492 18 0.06325 0.24815 [-0.438 0.535] 0.02645 4
40 80 2500 0.05798 0.24125 [-0.474 0.472] 0.01487 15 0.05386 0.22932 [-0.406 0.493] 0.02444 3
50 90 3000 0.06175 0.24898 [-0.489 0.487] 0.01535 16 0.06379 0.2508 [-0.452 0.532] 0.02673 6
Standard Error of Mean (SEM), Confidence Interval
(CI) by 95% and the number of incorrect classifica-
tion (Cls. err.). Firstly, we adjust RBF units’ cen-
ters based on MSE as a frequently used cost function
(minimization objective) in the literature. We employ
four optimization algorithms which are widely used and
adopted successfully in different applications including
PSO [80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85], Genetic Algorithm (GA)
[86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91], Imperialist Competitive Al-
gorithm (ICA) [92, 93, 94] and Differential Evolution
(DE) [95, 96, 97, 98]. The experiments on each al-
gorithm were repeated 20 times independently to find
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Table 9: Classification of Zoo data set based on RBF-PSO optimization algorithm
n Pop. Iter. Training data set Test data set
MSE Std. CI (95%) SEM Cls. err. MSE Std. CI (95%) SEM Cls. err.
Units’ centers by PSO:
30 50 2000 0.00156 0.03974 [-0.077 0.079] 0.00455 3 0.00394 0.0552 [-0.113 0.104] 0.01104 3
40 70 2500 0.00093 0.03024 [-0.059 0.059] 0.00366 1 0.00471 0.07 [-0.14 0.135] 0.01401 5
50 90 3000 0.00095 0.03114 [-0.061 0.061] 0.00335 3 0.00607 0.07197 [-0.157 0.131] 0.01439 4
Units’ centers by GA:
30 50 2000 0.00222 0.47477 [-0.093 0.094] 0.00544 4 0.00904 0.08952 [-0.212 0.139] 0.0179 7
40 70 2500 0.00141 0.03783 [-0.074 0.074] 0.00433 5 0.00595 0.07695 [-0.167 0.134] 0.01539 4
50 90 3000 0.00115 0.03422 [-0.067 0.067] 0.00392 4 0.00628 0.06858 [-0.147 0.122] 0.01383 4
Units’ centers by ICA:
30 50 2000 0.00211 0.04628 [-0.089 0.093] 0.0053 5 0.00706 0.08286 [-0.155 0.17] 0.01657 4
40 70 2500 0.0011 0.0334 [-0.065 0.066] 0.00383 2 0.00487 0.06209 [-0.155 0.17] 0.01241 6
50 90 3000 0.00102 0.03228 [-0.063 0.064] 0.0037 2 0.00826 0.08935 [-0.2 0.151] 0.01787 4
Units’ centers by DE:
30 50 2000 0.00159 0.04024 [-0.079 0.078] 0.00461 3 0.00514 0.07046 [-0.158 0.119] 0.01409 5
40 70 2500 0.00136 0.03712 [-0.073 0.073] 0.00425 4 0.00848 0.08664 [-0.206 0.134] 0.01733 6
50 90 3000 00113 0.03385 [-0.066 0.066] 0.00388 2 0.00635 0.074 [-0.155 0.135] 0.0148 4
(a) Multi objective (n=20) (b) Multi objective (n=40) (c) Multi objective (n=70)
Figure 5: Optimal Pareto fronts of Wine data set
(a) Multi objective (n=20) (b) Multi objective (n=50) (c) Multi objective (n=70)
Figure 6: Optimal Pareto fronts of Iris data set
the optimal considered performance criteria. Tables 2-
5 show the comparison of (best) results over applied
benchmarking problems. As seen in these Tables, PSO
performs better results in estimation of RBF units’ cen-
ters as compared to others based on the applied perfor-
mance measures. The second optimal results have also
performed by GA. However, we have evaluated all re-
sults as the (near) optimal adjustment of units’ centers
for adjusting two others RBF network parameters.
Secondly, for adjusting the RBF units’ widths and out-
put weights, we integrate the optimal placement of cen-
ters from four applied optimization algorithm (from Ta-
bles 2-5) with PSO. The obtained results are shown in
Tables 6-9. The classification error (Cls. err.) is cal-
culated based on our proposed algorithm in the second
phase. As seen in these tables, PSO is almost able to
11
(a) Multi objective (n=60) (b) Multi objective (n=80) (c) Multi objective (n=90)
Figure 7: Optimal Pareto fronts of Ionosphere data set
(a) Multi objective (n=50) (b) Multi objective (n=70) (c) Multi objective (n=90)
Figure 8: Optimal Pareto fronts of Zoo data set
achieve better results than the other methods in terms
of the classification error and other applied metrics. Ex-
perimental results demonstrate that even though the ICA
and the DE with not so proper results in obtaining RBF
units’ centers could successfully provide low classifica-
tion error. Unlike the suitable number of correct classifi-
cation by ICA and DE, they do not usually perform well
in terms of MSE, Std., CI (95%) and SEM as compared
to PSO and GA. Since the number of correct classifica-
tion is the major criterion in the classification problems,
it can be concluded that the MSE (as minimization ob-
jective) is not a suitable performance metric for finding
the (near) optimal placement of units’ centers. To con-
firm convincingly this claim, this paper presents a multi-
objective approach to find the (near) optimal placement
of centers. According to the first part of the proposed
method (see Fig. 4), NSGA II was applied over bench-
marking problems by two conflicting objectives (DBI
and MSE) in order to find the well-separated centers and
their local optimization, respectively. The experiment
on proposed algorithm was repeated 5 times indepen-
dently to find the optimal performance metrics. Figs.
5-8 are depicted the optimal Pareto front solutions of
(near) well-placed of RBF units’ centers through DBI
(x-axis) and MSE (y-axis). We are going to show that
for constructing final RBF neural networks, MSE is not
solely the ideal accurate criterion.
Afterward, we integrate the optimal placement of units’
centers (obtained by our two-objective approach in Figs.
5-8) with the PSO (see second step of the first phase
in Fig. 4) in order to optimize and tune units’ widths
and output weights. We run the PSO algorithm with all
the optimal Pareto front solutions of units’ centers. The
first five optimal results are demonstrated based on the
minimum classification error in both training and test-
ing data sets in Tables 10-13. As seen in these tables,
the first five optimal Pareto solutions outperform signif-
icantly the other methods by single-objective approach
in Tables 6-9 based on the MSE, Std. and the number
of misclassification error. Other applied performance
metrics outperforms the single-objective approach over
90% of results. The results show that the proposed
method can provide several well-placed RBF units’ cen-
ters as compared to the traditional (single-objective) ap-
proaches through MSE criterion. To sum up, MSE is
not an unique criterion to evaluate the performance of
12
Ta
bl
e
10
:C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
of
W
in
e
da
ta
se
tb
as
ed
on
pr
op
os
ed
m
et
ho
d
n
Po
p.
It
er
.
N
SG
A
II
Tr
ai
ni
ng
da
ta
se
t
Te
st
da
ta
se
t
M
SE
D
B
I
M
SE
St
d.
C
I(
95
%
)
SE
M
C
ls
.e
rr
.
M
SE
St
d.
C
I(
95
%
)
SE
M
C
ls
.e
rr
.
0.
22
52
0.
56
6
0.
00
63
7
0.
08
01
5
[-
0.
15
7
0.
15
8]
0.
00
69
2
0
0.
01
04
2
0.
10
33
1
[-
0.
22
2
0.
19
1]
0.
01
70
8
1
0.
22
49
0.
60
22
0.
00
70
2
0.
08
11
3
[-
0.
16
4
0.
16
6]
0.
00
72
6
0
0.
01
05
1
0.
10
15
6
[-
0.
22
7
0.
2]
0.
01
83
2
1
20
25
25
00
0.
23
03
0.
53
62
0.
00
73
4
0.
08
13
4
[-
0.
16
9
0.
17
]
0.
00
74
5
0
0.
01
05
5
0.
10
43
3
[-
0.
23
2
0.
20
1]
0.
01
87
4
1
0.
23
76
0.
41
96
0.
00
76
8
0.
08
19
6
[-
0.
16
2
0.
17
1]
0.
00
75
9
1
0.
01
06
2
0.
10
87
1
[-
0.
23
0.
21
]
0.
01
80
4
1
0.
24
52
0.
39
41
0.
00
81
4
0.
08
35
7
[-
0.
16
7
0.
17
4]
0.
00
78
2
1
0.
01
03
6
0.
10
76
9
[-
0.
21
7
0.
20
2]
0.
01
62
3
2
0.
20
04
0.
37
99
0.
00
49
0.
07
02
7
[-
0.
13
8
0.
13
8]
0.
00
60
7
0
0.
01
07
4
0.
10
32
2
[-
0.
22
1
0.
18
4]
0.
01
55
6
1
0.
19
73
0.
40
32
0.
00
49
1
0.
07
03
1
[-
0.
13
7
0.
13
9]
0.
00
60
7
0
0.
01
31
2
0.
11
35
3
[-
0.
24
6
0.
2]
0.
01
63
1
1
40
30
25
00
0.
19
93
0.
38
03
0.
00
51
0.
07
65
7
[-
0.
14
9
0.
15
1]
0.
00
66
1
0
0.
01
38
2
0.
11
43
6
[-
0.
24
7
0.
20
1]
0.
01
66
1
1
0.
20
95
0.
35
32
0.
00
52
7
0.
07
95
2
[-
0.
15
5
0.
15
7]
0.
00
68
7
0
0.
01
31
6
0.
11
43
8
[-
0.
25
1
0.
19
8]
0.
01
66
9
1
0.
20
74
0.
36
46
0.
00
55
6
0.
07
98
1
[-
0.
15
6
0.
15
7]
0.
00
70
2
0
0.
01
38
5
0.
11
31
1
[-
0.
25
9
0.
18
5]
0.
01
62
5
2
0.
16
38
0.
26
61
0.
00
39
7
0.
06
32
6
[-
0.
12
5
0.
12
3]
0.
00
54
6
0
0.
01
26
2
0.
11
06
2
[-
0.
24
3
0.
19
1]
0.
01
66
7
1
0.
16
57
0.
25
47
0.
00
44
2
0.
06
67
5
[-
0.
13
1
0.
13
1]
0.
00
57
6
0
0.
01
26
3
0.
11
00
6
[-
0.
24
4
0.
18
8]
0.
01
65
9
1
70
40
35
00
0.
16
36
0.
27
67
0.
00
44
5
0.
06
69
2
[-
0.
12
8
0.
13
5]
0.
00
57
8
0
0.
01
29
8
0.
11
38
7
[-
0.
24
1
0.
20
5]
0.
01
71
6
1
0.
16
30
0.
30
11
0.
00
45
6
0.
06
78
1
[-
0.
13
3
0.
13
2]
0.
00
58
5
0
0.
01
27
6
0.
11
38
6
[-
0.
23
3
0.
21
3]
0.
01
71
6
2
0.
16
74
0.
24
54
0.
00
51
1
0.
06
96
3
[-
0.
14
2
0.
13
1]
0.
00
61
8
0
0.
01
31
5
0.
11
56
9
[-
0.
24
3
0.
21
]
0.
01
74
4
2
the units’ centers in RBF networks. A new hybrid op-
timization approach for well-separated centers (such as
by DBI) and their local optimization (such as by MSE)
in estimation of RBF units’ centers would fit consider-
ably the performance requirements.
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10. Evaluation environment
We use simulations to quantify effects of DoS at-
tacks and their countermeasures. In this work, we used
the open-source ndnSIM [99] package, which imple-
ments NDN protocol stack for NS-3 network simu-
lator (http://www.nsnam.org/), to run simulations
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for evaluating the performance of considered mitiga-
tion method. ndnSIM simulation environment repro-
duces the basic structures of a NDN node (i.e., CS, PIT,
FIB, strategy layer, and so on). The proposed detec-
tion method (first phase) was implemented by the MAT-
LAB software on the Intel Pentium 2.13 GHz CPU, 4
GB RAM running Windows 7 Ultimate. This algorithm
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1
deployed to C++ project integrating as a C++ shared
library using the MATLAB compiler. Then, this C++
program was integrated with ndnSIM environment to
be able to adjust in the simulation environment. The
proposed adaptive reaction was also implemented with
C++ in ndnSIM environment. We demonstrate through
simulations that our countermeasure satisfies consider-
14
ably applied performance metrics as compared to two
recently applied DoS attack mitigation methods namely
satisfaction-based pushback and satisfaction-based In-
terest acceptance [15]. We perform 10 times simulation
runs to calculate the average performance metrics.
Our experiments are performed over two topologies
shown in Figs. 9 and 10. Fig. 9 corresponds to DFN-
like (Deutsche Forschungsnetz as the German Research
Network) [100], and Fig. 10 corresponds to the AT&T
network [101]. We use the symbols Cx, Px, Rx, and Ax
to represent x-th consumer, producer, router and adver-
sary nodes, respectively. In spite of various arguments
and experiments, there is no typically and properly jus-
tification for NDN parameters and they have specified
based on authors’ experiences and designs [2]. The
experimental setup (i.e., attack and non-attack traffics
modeling) is performed over two applied topologies as
follows. For attack effectiveness, we examine the per-
formance of the network’s data packet delivery and sat-
isfied Interest rate under the different scenarios (see DoS
attacks issues in section 3):
1. Interest flooding attack (dynamically-generated In-
terest packets) for the existent Data.
2. Interest flooding (dynamically-generated Interest
packets) for the non-existent Data. It can be in the
form of brute-force attack (very high distribution
of Interest) or normal distribution of Interest.
3. Hijacking, in which a producer silently drops all
incoming Interest traffic in downstream interfaces.
4. Content poisoning (bogus data packets), in which
a producer deliberately signs data packets with a
wrong key. We assume that the routers firstly check
the signature filed of data packet, then cache and
route the packet toward its destination if the signa-
ture is valid. Hence, the bogus data packets cannot
be cached in the intermediate routers.
In our configurations, we set nodes’ PIT size to 120
KB, while the Interest expiration time was set to the
default timeout of 4 sec. We set the link delay and
queue length parameters to fixed values for every node
in the simulated topologies. In particular, we set delay
and queue length to 10 ms and 400 for both considered
topologies, respectively. The PIT entries replacement
policy was adopted to the least-recently-used (the old-
est entry with minimum number of incoming faces will
be removed if PIT size reached its limit) as a widely
used strategy. The nodes’ cache capacity was set to
1000 contents and cache replacement policy was set to
least-recently-used method. The other system settings
of investigated network topologies are summarized in
Table 14. As shown in this table, we ran various traffic
Figure 9: DFN-like topology
patterns in which each configuration changes in every
10 simulation runs in order to perform different network
characteristics.
We first analyze the topologies without any adversarial
traffic, then with adversarial traffic, finally considera-
tion of the proposed mitigation method over the illegit-
imate traffics. Our assumption is that, the behavior of
legitimate (honest) consumers is unchanged in duration
of the simulation, and the adversary is not allowed to
control routers. To study the performance of our pro-
posed countermeasure algorithm under range of condi-
tions, we varied the percentage of attackers and their run
times in the considered topologies in Table 14.
11. The proposed countermeasure: proactive detec-
tion and adaptive reaction
In this section, we introduce our method, a two
phases -detection and reaction- framework for mitigat-
ing DoS attacks in NDN.
11.1. Detection Phase
This step adopts our proposed intelligent classifier
from section 8.1. We choose the DFN-like topology
(Fig. 9) in the training phase with the recommended pa-
rameter settings in Table 14. We then apply this trained
network for the detection purposes in both DFN-like
and AT&T topologies.
NDN routers can easily keep track of unsatisfied (ex-
pired) Interests and use this information for DoS attack
countermeasures such as, pending Interests per outgo-
ing and incoming interfaces, and pending Interests per
15
Figure 10: AT&T topology
Table 14: Network parameters considered
Node Distribution Pattern Frequency Run time (minute) Producer Goal
DFN-like topology (Fig. 9)
C1 randomize uniform [100 500] 0-40 P1 normal
C2 randomize exponential [100 500] 2-40 P2 normal
C3 Zipf-Mandelbort (α = [0.5 0.9]) exponential [100 500] 3-40 P3 normal
C4 randomize uniform [100 500] 4-40 P6 normal
C5 Zipf-Mandelbort (α = [0.5 0.9]) exponential [100 500] 3-40 P2, P3 normal
C6 randomize uniform [100 500] 5-40 P3 normal
C7 randomize uniform [100 500] 7-16, 22-31 P6, P4 sign data with the wrong key
C8 randomize exponential [100 500] 8-18, 25-40 P1 normal
A1 randomize uniform [1500 3000] 7-16 P1 Interest flooding for existence data
A2 Zipf-Mandelbort (α = [0.5 0.9]) uniform [1500 3000] 22-31 no producer Interest flooding for non-existence data
A3 randomize uniform [400 800] 7-16 P5 (hijacker) hijacking incoming Interest packets
A4 randomize exponential [1500 3000] 22-31 P6 Interest flooding for existence data
AT&T topology (Fig. 10)
C0, C7 randomize uniform [200 600] 0-50 P0, P1 normal
C1, C8 randomize exponential [200 600] 2-50 P0 normal
C2, C9 randomize exponential [200 600] 3-50 P1 normal
C3, C10 randomize uniform [200 600] 4-50 P1 normal
C4, C11 Zipf-Mandelbort (α = [0.5 0.9]) exponential [200 600] 5-50 P0, P1 normal
C5, C12, C13 randomize uniform [200 600] 6-50 P0, P1 normal
C6, C14, C15 randomize uniform [200 600] 8-50 P1 normal
A0 randomize uniform [1000 3000] 7-25 P1 Interest flooding for existence data
A0 randomize exponential [1000 3000] 30-45 P1 Interest flooding for existence data
A1 Zipf-Mandelbort (α = [0.5 0.9]) exponential [500 1000] 7-25 P0 sign data with the wrong key
A1 Zipf-Mandelbort (α = [0.5 0.9]) uniform [1000 3000] 30-45 no producer Interest flooding for non-existence data
A2 randomize exponential [1000 3000] 7-25 no producer Interest flooding for non-existence data
A2 randomize uniform [1000 3000] 30-45 P1 Interest flooding for existence data
namespace. The proper combining/choosing of statis-
tic parameters in NDN routers for maximum effective-
ness against attacks and anomalies, minimum disorder-
ing of legitimate traffics, and distinguishing between
’good’ and ’bad’ Interest packets are research chal-
lenges [15, 20]. Hence, we employed simple intrin-
sic features from the network which is shown in Table
15 (i.e., the input features in the RBF neural network).
In the training process, all the features beginning with
’In’ are suitable for prediction of the misbehaving con-
sumers and the features by ’Out’ are suitable for pre-
diction of the misbehaving producers. Taking into ac-
count only a specific or a group (e.g., ’In’ or ’Out’) of
features may cause the detection algorithm to report a
wrong prediction. For example, if there are two PIT
entries that share the same prefix and one Data packet
arrives, there will be two entries of In/Out satisfied In-
terest but only one In/Out Data, since both Interests can
16
be satisfied with the same Data. Hence, if a number
of In/Out Data be more than the In/Out satisfied Inter-
est for a given interface or vice versa, it would not be a
misbehaving. Another instance is that, Interest packets
from a consumer are possible to arrive to several routers
and perhaps several producers that can satisfy the In-
terests. Corresponding data packet will send back from
producer(s). A router in the middle way, receives the
first packet from any producer and will forward it to the
consumer and remove the PIT entry. When the second
Data object arrives to the router, it will be discarded by
the routers as unsolicited. Hence, it is more likely that
a rate of In/Out Data or DropData be more than In/Out
Interest rate and vice versa in a corresponding interface.
Obviously, it is not an attack or anomaly behavior. Also,
in a given interface, the rate of the InInterest may be less
that the SatisfiedInterest rate which in due to the portion
of the satisfaction rate comes from the previous time in-
terval. On the other hand, the rate of the OutData may
be more than the InInterest rate, which is for routing the
cached data for satisfying incoming Interest packets. To
sum up, different parameters mentioned by our detec-
tion module act as weights and counterweights for mis-
behaving consumer and producer detection purposes.
For constructing a predictor module based on the RBF
neural network, at first the centers, widths and weights
are computed and adjusted using training set 75% of
data set, and then the remaining part of the data set as
the test set, is used to validate the trained network func-
tionality. We trained and evaluated the network with
various number of RBF units, where the three optimal
results are summarized in Table 16. The optimal Pareto
front solutions by NSGA II are also depicted in Fig.
11. We computed the MSE, Std., CI (95%), SEM and
classification error for both training and testing parts.
The histogram analysis of the classification error dis-
tribution and the regression analysis of the misclassifi-
cation are shown in Figs. 12 and 13, respectively. As
seen in these Figures and Table 16, third parameter set-
tings could provide the better results as compared to the
two others in terms of the applied performance metrics.
Hence, these (near) optimal parameter settings are used
to construct our RBF classifier (predictor).
As we expected (based on our proof in section 9), This
phase constructs an optimized and more accurate RBF
classifier (predictor) for our DoS attack mitigation pur-
poses in NDN. According to the traffic flows type in the
training data set (see Table 14), this predictor learned
three types of traffic patterns including normal, mali-
cious behavior from consumers and producers. This
predictor module runs on routers, in order to continu-
ously monitor per-interface required statistical informa-
tion. This module is executed at fixed time intervals
-typically every 0.5 sec - to provide a proactive detec-
tion behavior. Finally, based on three types of predic-
tion (normal, misbehaving consumer and misbehaving
producer), we should respond an appropriate action as
detailed in the next subsection.
Table 15: Feature construction
Feature Description
InInterests a number of arrival Interest in an interface
InData a number of arrival data in an interface
InSatisfiedInterests a number of satisfied Interests whereinterface was part of the incoming set
InTimedOutInterests a number of timed out Interests whereinterface was part of the incoming set
OutInterests a number of sent Interest from an interface
OutData a number of sent data from an interface
OutSatisfiedInterests a number of satisfied Interests whereinterface was part of the outgoing set
OutTimedOutInterests a number of timed out Interests whereinterface was part of the outgoing set
DropInterests a number of dropped Interest in an interface
DropData a number of dropped data in an interface
SatisfiedInterests a total number of satisfied Interests
TimedOutInterests a total number of timed out Interests
Figure 11: Optimal Pareto fronts of DFN-like training
phase
11.2. Reaction Phase
Once a DoS attack from interface j of router i has
been identified with the proposed proactive detector (see
section 11.1), our reaction mechanism enables and en-
forces explicit limitation based on the prediction type
(adversary consumer or adversary producer) for each in-
terface. The proposed intelligent proactive detector re-
ports misbehaving in the early stages of beginning DoS
attacks. Our adaptive reaction criterion for misbehav-
ing consumer directly depends on the local interface’s
Interest unsatisfied ratio and for misbehaving producer
directly depends on the forwarding strategy. The orig-
inal settings and Interest rate are restored once the de-
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(a) 1st histogram (b) 2nd histogram (c) 3rd histogram
Figure 12: The histogram analysis of the classification error distribution in DFN-like topology
(a) 1st Regression (94.97%) (b) 2nd Regression (94.96%) (c) 3rd Regression (95.18%)
Figure 13: Regression of the classification error between target and predicted output in DFN-like topology
tector module reports the normal traffic in the next time
interval.
Figure 14: unsatisfied-based pushback example
11.2.1. reaction regarding to misbehaving consumer
When the proposed intelligent detector module
in router detects adversarial traffics from a set of
interfaces, it sends an alert message on each of
them. An alert message is an unsolicited content
packet which belongs to a reserved namespace
(”/pushbackmessage/alert/”) in our implementa-
tion. There are two reasons for using content packet
rather than Interest packet for carrying pushback
message [11]:
1. during an attack, the PIT of next hop connected to
the offending interface may be full, and therefore
the alert message may be discarded, and
2. content packets are signed, while Interests are not.
This allows routers to receive the content packets
as a legitimate packet for processing.
The payload of an alert message contains the timestamp
corresponding to the generation time of the alert mes-
sage, the new reduced (unsatisfied) rate and the wait
time of reduction period. The formal definition of our
unsatisfied-based pushback mechanism presents in Fig.
14. Assuming in a time interval in router C the predictor
reports a misbehaving traffic from a consumer (neigh-
18
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1
bor node). Also, an unsatisfied rate is 50% for eth0
and 70% for eth1. Our proposed reaction mechanism
is as follows:
1. Router C will send a pushback alert message to the
neighbors from eth0 and eth1.
2. Routers A and B, after receiving alert mes-
sage from C will readjust their local inter-
faces limit to ’announced reduced rate’ ×
’local unsatisfied rate’ in each local inter-
face. If the new limit in the corresponding inter-
face exceeds the predefined threshold φ, the cor-
responding interface gets new reduction of Inter-
est rate in downstream. For instance, we assume
φ = 5% so that router B decreases the Interest rate
of eth0 to 50% and eth1 to 15%. Router A de-
creases the Interest rate in its three interfaces to
63%, 0 (the new limit rate (=3.5%) is under pre-
defined threshold (=5%) and will not be changed)
and 28% in eth0, eth1 and eth2, respectively.
This threshold allows bandwidth usage be con-
sumed for legitimate traffics in the nearest next
time interval and intensifies Interest rate reduction
for adversaries in each next time intervals.
3. Our wait time strategy for the reduction period in
neighbor nodes is an ascending penalty. If in a
time interval t in interface j the misbehaving traf-
fic be reported, a counter sets to 1 sec. If in the
next time interval t+1 the misbehaving again be
reported, a counter sets to 2 sec. Our ascending
penalty method is in 2counter. Initially, counter = 0
and increase linearly in each time interval. The
counter is set to the initial value when there is no
misbehaving prediction in the next time interval.
This ascending penalty intensifies the penalty for
adversaries and alleviates the bandwidth usage for
legitimate (honest) users.
4. Any neighbor node may obey (ignore) the an-
nounced limit rate and send Interest packets with-
out any restriction from the upstream interface.
Our algorithm after twice refusing the alert mes-
sage will band the incoming Interest packets from
the corresponding interface for a long time period.
At the next iteration of the unsatisfied-based pushback
mechanism, legitimate user(s) will be able to gradu-
ally improve their satisfaction rate and sending Interest
packets on both router A and B. After applying the alert
message in router A, the Interest rate of the adversary
will be decreased to around 63% in the next iteration.
It allows bandwidth usage be consumed for 2nd legiti-
mate user, that it will considerably led to the increasing
of legitimate Interests rate. If the adversary continues its
misbehaving in the next times, the ascending wait time
strategy will increase the penalty rate of the illegal Inter-
est packets. Hence, eth1 and eth2 interfaces in router
A will get through and return Data, eventually resulting
in a full allowance in the link between the routers A and
C.
The Pseudo-code of the unsatisfied-based pushback
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mechanism is shown in Algorithm 1. In this algo-
rithm, the Decrease function decreases the Interest rate
from corresponding interface with announced param-
eters. After normal traffic prediction, the Increase
function sets the default Interest rate on the correspond-
ing interface in the next time interval. The IsFresh
function checks the freshness of the alert message when
there is no previously alert message.
Input: AlertMsg, timestamp of alert generation, reduced
rate and wait time from interface j in router i (r ji )
Result: (1) adaptive pushback reaction and (2) pushback alert
message generation
1 counter j = 0 // initial counter for generating wait
time in interface j
2 φ = 5% // reduction threshold of Interest rate
/* section: adaptive pushback reaction */
3 if AlertMsg is Pushback alert message then
4 if Verify(AlertMsg.signature ) and
IsFresh(AlertMsg.timestamp ) then
/* Pushback reaction */
5 foreach local interface j do
6 new rate = unsatisfied rate of j ×
announced reduced rate ;
7 if φ < new rate then
/* intensify the penalty */
8 Decrease(interface j, new rate,
announced wait time );
9 else
/* reset to original setting */
10 Increase(interface j, original rate ) ;
11 else
12 Drop(AlertMsg ) ;
13 return ;
/* section: Pushback alert message generation
*/
14 if (predictor module reports the adversary consumer
(neighbor) in local interface j) then
15 if (time from last sent AlertMsg to local interface r ji <
current local time) then
/* Pushback alert message generation */
16 new time interval = 2counter j ;
17 AlertMsg = (current timestamp of alert generation,
current unsatisfied rate in local interface j, new
time interval);
18 Send(AlertMsg to r ji );
19 counter j = counter j + 1;
20 else
/* reset to original setting */
21 counter j = 0 ;
22 Increase(interface j, original rate ) ;
Algorithm 1: Unsatisfied-based pushback algo-
rithm
11.2.2. reaction regarding to misbehaving producer
If the predictor module predicts a misbehaving pro-
ducer from an interface j, we build an adaptive and sim-
ple forwarding strategy. The main goal is to retrieve
data via the best performance path(s), and to quickly re-
cover packet delivery problem by the other (possible) le-
gitimate producers. When a predictor module in a router
i reports a misbehaving producer in an interface j, the in-
terface status changes to the unavailable (can not bring
data back) and will be deactivated for a predefined time
interval. This type of forwarding strategy can increase
the data retrieving chance for awaiting Interest packets
in the PIT table by changing the forwarding path. We
apply the wait time strategy from the misbehaving con-
sumer section (see section 11.2.1). After normal pre-
diction in the next time intervals, the interface status
changes to available (can bring data back). It means,
it is ready for forwarding Interest packets via this inter-
face. It is expected that in the next time intervals, when
there is no any legitimate producer to satisfy the corre-
sponding Interest packets in an interface j, the predictor
module reports misbehaving consumer (neighbor) from
upstream interface j, where Interest packets are suscep-
tible to be illegal traffics. Then, the rate of incoming
Interest packets should gradually decrease in upstream
interface j based on our ascending penalty mechanism
in previous subsection.
12. Experimental results and evaluation
In this section we report the experimental evaluation
of countermeasures presented in Section 11. Our coun-
termeasures are tested over two considered topologies
in Figs. 9 and 10. Each router implements the proposed
detection technique discussed in Section 11.1 and adap-
tive reaction technique discussed in 11.2.
We report the results based on the five conditions: base-
line, attack (no countermeasure), our proposed method,
and two DoS mitigation methods applied in this work
including satisfaction-based pushback and satisfaction-
based Interest acceptance from [15]. Figs. 15 and
18 show the average Interest satisfaction ratio for le-
gitimate users within 10 runs in DFN-like and AT&T
topologies, respectively. Our results show that the pro-
posed intelligent hybrid algorithm (proactive detection
and adaptive reaction) is very effective for shutting
down the adversary traffics and preventing legitimate
users from service degradation by the accuracy more
than 90% during the attack.
Figs. 16 and 19 demonstrate the average PIT usage
within 10 runs in five considered conditions in DFN-like
20
Figure 15: Interest satisfaction ratio for legitimate users in DFN
Figure 16: PIT usage with countermeasures in DFN
Figure 17: Effects of countermeasures in DFN (Throughput)
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Figure 18: Interest satisfaction ratio for legitimate users in AT&T
Figure 19: PIT usage with countermeasures in AT&T
Figure 20: Effects of countermeasures in AT&T (Throughput)
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and AT&T topologies, respectively. Our results show
that there is a significant benefit of the proposed coun-
termeasure in reduction of PIT usage in presence of an
adversary. In Figs. 17 and 20 we show the average
number of content received (throughput) in DFN-like
and AT&T topologies, respectively. The results show
that the proposed countermeasure is effective and effi-
cient in presence of adversary. For clarity, we just re-
port measurements for those routers that are affected
by the attacks for AT&T topology. The most routers in
both considered topologies exhibit an interesting behav-
ior. The proposed mechanism in both steps (detection
by an intelligent hybrid method and reaction by enforc-
ing explicit limitations against adversaries) offers visi-
bly promising performance in presence of adversary.
12.1. Two facts of DoS/DDoS mitigation in NDN
Experimental results and analysis show that the two
conditions can cause a DoS mitigation method degrades
service to legitimate consumers:
1. Producers can misbehave by dropping incoming
Interest packets or signing data packets with the
wrong keys as they are unwilling to forward data
packets to legitimate consumers. We conducted
this experiment in AT&T topology by producer P0
between 7-25 seconds of simulation run (see Ta-
ble 14), in which consumers C0, C1, C4, C5, C7,
C8, C11, C12, and C13 request their desirable data
packets from that producer. When our proposed
predictor in an interface reports a misbehaving pro-
ducer, the corresponding interface status changes
to unavailable and will be deactivated (see section
11.2.2). Consequently, the data retrieving chance
for awaiting Interest packets increases by chang-
ing the forwarding path towards the producer P1
except C1 and C8, because other consumers can
be satisfied with more than one producer. It is an
expected behavior from a predictor until there is
either no misbehaved producer or an extra well-
behaved producer. As a result of this condition,
it seems reasonable to decrease the rate of Interest
packets for legitimate consumers.
2. A DoS mitigation technique should be able to de-
tect malevolent behaviors and any deviation ide-
ally long before the destructive traffics build-up
and block the network traffics belonging to the
attackers without denying services to legitimate
consumers in a timely manner. If a mitigation
technique cannot detect DoS attacks in a timely
manner, the generated overload by DoS attacks
prevents the resource from responding to legiti-
mate traffic, or slows its response so significantly
a (high) percentage of the legitimate Interest pack-
ets are completely disrupted. In this way, DoS
mitigation techniques often create false positives
(false alarms) by dropping legitimate Interest pack-
ets or enforcing limitations incorrectly against le-
gitimate consumers. False positive refers to nor-
mal traffics when are incorrectly decreased by
enforcing explicit limitations from our proposed
unsatisfied-based pushback mechanism and other
considered countermeasures during DoS/DDoS at-
tacks (see section 11.2). Table 17 demonstrates
the average rate of false positives obtained by our
method and other applied countermeasures within
10 runs. This table shows that the proposed mit-
igation method is characterized by an extremely
low false positive rate as compared to other coun-
termeasures which is important when dealing with
DoS/DDoS attacks. It can be concluded that the
proposed intelligent hybrid predictor is able to de-
tect DoS/DDoS attacks in a timely manner to pre-
vent service degradation for legitimate users.
A future work is needed in the classification
of legitimate users’ traffics as either good (non-
malicious), bad (malicious) or low and high prone
to attack traffics (non-malicious, but with the same
properties as malicious traffics).
12.2. Discussion
A new intelligent hybrid algorithm (proactive detec-
tion and adaptive reaction) for mitigating DoS attacks
in Named Data Networking has been proposed. The
first part (detection) of this new algorithm (Fig. 4)
consists of two phases: training/optimization and pre-
diction/classification. In the training phase, an hybrid
optimization algorithm has been developed to resolve
the hybrid learning problem of RBF neural networks us-
ing multiobjective evolutionary algorithm and PSO. The
first step of this phase adjusts RBF units’ centers based
on NSGA II through two conflicting objectives: well-
separated centers (by Davies Boulding Index (DBI)) and
local optimization of centers (by Mean-Squared Error
(MSE)). Second step of this phase trains units’ widths
and output weights using PSO. This step tunes and ad-
justs widths and weights simultaneously by the well-
separated centers from the previous step. In the pre-
diction phase, a simple and an effective prediction algo-
rithm has been designed to classify the new input pat-
terns in their actual classes. This part of our hybrid al-
gorithm has been successfully applied to define a more
accurate RBF classifier over the NDN traffic flows as
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Table 17: Comparison of false positive rate (mean of 10 runs)
Topology No countermeasure Satisfaction-based Interest acceptance Satisfaction-based pushback Our method
DFN 59.78% 21.05% 14.47% 6.44%
AT&T 66.43% 24.29% 19.13% 9.26%
well as distinguish intelligently DoS attack traffics.
Convergence of the proposed RBF classifier (predictor)
is studied for finding global and optimal classification
of different benchmarking data sets as Wine, Iris, Iono-
sphere and Zoo. We applied the single-objective ap-
proach in Tables 2-5 (training units’ centers) and Tables
6-9 (training units’ widths, output weights and calcu-
lating the misclassification error), and our conflicting
two-objective approach in Figs. 5-8 (Pareto front of
the units’ centers solutions) and Tables 10-13 (training
units’ widths, output weights and calculating the mis-
classification error). Experimental results confirm the
accuracy and the robustness of the proposed approach
based on the several performance metrics: MSE, Stan-
dard Deviation (Std.), Standard Error of Mean (SEM),
Confidence Interval (CI 95%) and the number of incor-
rect classification.
The feasibility and efficiency of the proposed RBF clas-
sifier (predictor) method was compared to four well-
known and frequently used optimization algorithms.
Tables 6-9 demonstrate the final results, using PSO, Ge-
netic Algorithm (GA), Imperialist Competitive Algo-
rithm (ICA) and Differential Evolution (DE). The pro-
posed algorithm in this paper outperforms all applied
methods based on the (near) optimal results in the num-
ber of correct classification, MSE and Std. criteria. It
can be concluded that the proposed intelligent hybrid
algorithm is able to construct more accurate and well-
tuned RBF classifier for (near) optimal classification of
input patterns.
Although, the proposed method and other methods use
different parameter settings. Our method was repeated 5
times and others were repeated 20 times independently
to find the global results in the training/optimization
phase; therefore, the effect of tuning parameters on per-
formance of the methods are studied. We repeated the
proposed training phase less than other methods to show
that our two-objective approach is able to tune and ad-
just RBF parameters faster and more accurate than other
methods.
The proposed intelligent classifier was successfully
adopted in the detection phase of our countermeasure
(see section 11.1). After constructing the intelligent hy-
brid classifier (predictor) module, an adaptive reaction
mechanism by enforcing explicit limitations against ad-
versaries was proposed to mitigate potential DoS/DDoS
attacks in NDN (see section 11.2). Finally, conver-
gence, feasibility and efficiency of the proposed algo-
rithm (proactive detection and adaptive reaction) is stud-
ied for finding the optimal placement of RBF units’
centers, units’ widths and output weights and measur-
ing the suitable performance over two network topolo-
gies including DFN-like (Fig. 9) and AT&T (Fig. 10).
The results were promising as compared to two recently
proposed DoS mitigation methods from [15] based on
the average of Interest satisfaction ratio for legitimate
users, the PIT usage, the number of received contents
(throughput), and a very low false positive rate over 10
simulation runs.
13. Conclusion
NDN is a newly proposed future Internet architecture
which it is important to address its resilience in face
of DoS/DDoS attacks. We examined the most current
instances of DoS/DDoS attacks to show that an adver-
sary with limited resources can serve service degrada-
tion for legitimate users. We then introduced our intel-
ligent hybrid algorithm for proactive detection of DoS
attacks and adaptive reaction for mitigating. In the de-
tection phase, a combination of multiobjective evolu-
tionary optimization and RBF neural network has been
applied. This approach consists of two phases: train-
ing/optimization and prediction/classification. In the
training phase, we investigate the implementation of a
multiobjective approach and PSO in the design of RBF
neural network in order to improve the accuracy of clas-
sification problems. We apply NSGA II to determine
the Pareto solutions of RBF units’ centers in terms of
the well-separated centers through DBI and their local
optimization through MSE. Then, the optimization and
tuning of the units’ widths and output weights are ac-
complished by using the PSO, where the each particle
encodes a set of widths and weights. Moreover, the
structure of this step is simple and easy to implement,
yet very effective in terms of several performance crite-
ria. In the prediction phase, we employ a simple algo-
rithm to classify efficiency the new input patterns with
the minimum misclassification error. This hybrid algo-
rithm was applied on four benchmarking data sets to
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verify the algorithm accuracy and robustness in classifi-
cation problems.
Subsequently, after constructing a more accurate classi-
fier (detector), we performed a simple adaptive reaction
algorithm by enforcing explicit limitations against ad-
versaries which was very effective and efficient for shut-
ting down the attackers with the robust recovery from
network failures and accuracy more than 90% in terms
of the average of Interest satisfaction ratio for legitimate
users, the PIT usage, the number of received contents
(throughput), and a very low false positive rate over 10
simulation runs.
We are currently investigating inter-domain DoS at-
tacks. We leave further investigations to future work.
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